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Dissecting Bioethics
‘‘Dissecting Bioethics,’’ edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Ha¨yry,
welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions
of bioethics.
The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by
bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people’s
actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the
many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of
a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-
evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated.
The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, natural-
ness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of
reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.
All submitted papers are peer reviewed. To submit a paper or to
discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala at tuija.takala@helsinki.fi.
Dignity: One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Still
Counting
DORIS SCHROEDER
Principles and concepts are vital to
constructive ethical debates. We ex-
press moral beliefs from approval to
unease and outrage with reference to
principles. For instance, Barack Obama
condemned Iranian authorities’ clamp-
down on protesters as an ‘‘unjust action
against its own people.’’1 French legis-
lators call for a ban of the burka
arguing that it amounts ’’to a breach
of individual freedoms on our national
territory.’’2 The Muslim Women’s
League maintains that ‘‘[s]piritual
equality . . . for both men and women
is a well-developed theme in the
Quran.’’3
For principles to be useful in ethical
debates, they need to be
a) widely known
b) specified
c) attributable.
For instance, an ethical principle that is
widely used in South Africa, Ubuntu4,
will be useless in Germany, where the
term denotes a Linux-based operating
system. Likewise, if the essence of a prin-
ciple cannot be explained and specified,
it will be no more useful in ethical de-
bates than a random word. And, finally,
failure to attribute principles reasonably
to entities will lead to irresolvable dis-
agreements in ethical debates (e.g., an
insistence that all animals have a right
to freedom of movement).
The concept of dignity is omnipres-
ent in law, religion, the media, litera-
ture, politics, and ethics5. It is almost
impossible to avoid its encounter on
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a daily basis. As a result, it fulfills
condition (a) easily; it is widely known.
Yet, eminent bioethicists and philoso-
phers have argued that it is a useless
concept,6 very dubious,7 a conversation
stopper without clear meaning,8 and
an idea that cannot be thought.9 These
concerns focus on the vagueness of the
concept, that is, that it cannot be spec-
ified satisfactorily and therefore does
not meet condition (b). By contrast, I
argue that dignity can be specified if
one accepts that there is no single
meaning but that its problems lie with
difficulties of attributability, that is,
condition (c).
Different Meanings of Dignity
In an earlier piece in CQ, I argued that
dignity is more than simply respect for
autonomy and that an analysis of the
concept can illuminate ethical debates
as long as one does not expect just one
clearly delineated meaning.10 I identi-
fied and defined four distinct meanings.
Kantian Dignity
Definition: Dignity is an inviolable
property of all human beings, which
gives the possessor the right never to be
treated simply as a means, but always
at the same time as an end.
Examples: Kant—"[A] human being . . .
possesses a dignity (an absolute inner
worth) by which he exacts respect for
himself from all other beings in the
world."11 Pope John Paul II—"I feel the
duty to reaffirm strongly that the . . .
personal dignity of every human being
does not change. A man, even if seri-
ously ill or disabled . . . will always be
a man."12
Aristocratic Dignity
Definition: Dignity is the outwardly
displayed quality of a human being
who acts in accordance with her supe-
rior rank and position.
Examples: ’’Conducting a public ro-
mance may have reduced the dignity
of the presidency, but Sarkozy is pres-
ident for an era in which dignity is less
important than humanity.’’13 ’’Will
sports instructor Daniel Westling have
the required dignity to represent the
[Swedish] crown when he marries the
heir to the throne Victoria in the sum-
mer of 2010?’’14
Comportment Dignity
Definition: Dignity is the outwardly
displayed quality of a human being
who acts in accordance with society’s
expectations of well-mannered de-
meanor and bearing.
Examples: ’’The old dignity code has
not survived modern life. . . . Every
week there are new scandals featuring
people who simply do not know how
to act. . . . [T]here was Mark Sanford’s15
press conference. Here was a guy ut-
terly lacking in any sense of reticence,
whowas given to rambling self-exposure
even in his moment of disgrace.’’16
‘‘His lips curled in an involuntary sneer
as he looked around the train carriage
and saw how many of the passengers
were already. . . dozing, . . . their mouths
hanging stupidly open, their heads
lolling, their eyelids drooping heavily.
Did these people have no sense of
dignity?’’17
Meritorious Dignity
Definition: Dignity is a virtue, which
subsumes the four cardinal virtues and
one’s sense of self-worth.
Examples: Goethe—‘‘A wreath is
much easier bound than a dignified
head for it found.’’18 Aristotle—‘‘Dign-
ity does not consist in possessing hon-
ors, but in deserving them.’’19
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In the following, I first expand these
four concepts of dignity to five, then
contract the five meanings into two
distinct groupings, namely, inviolable
and aspirational dignity. Finally I show
that the vagueness and alleged useless-
ness of dignity derives from unresolved
issues around the attributability of in-
violable dignity.
Kantian Dignity Reexamined
If one looks at the four definitions of
dignity above, it is noticeable that only
the Kantian concept of dignity does not
tell us what dignity actually is. It
simply tells us that it is inviolable
and that it confers rights upon its
human holders. By contrast, the other
three dignity concepts are almost
graphic in their clarity. Whether we
agree with his judgment or not, we
understand what the Indian journalist
means when he counterposes the dig-
nity of the French presidency with
a courtship conducted in swimming
trunks in an Egyptian beach resort.20
And whether we agree with Coe’s
protagonist or not, we understand
what he describes when he disap-
proves of the comportment of fellow
passengers napping on a train, mouths
open. We also understand Goethe’s
sentiment that a dignified head is rare,
though we may each have different
mental pictures of who deserves to be
thus crowned.
Does Kantian dignity also have such
graphic clarity? No, it does not. In the
following I argue that the vagueness
derives from a contradiction between
the alleged universal inviolability of
dignity and the conferment of rights.
According to Kant, human beings
have a moral right never to be treated
only as a means. He writes:
[A] human being regarded as a per-
son, that is, as the subject of a morally
practical reason, is exalted above
any price; for as a person (homo
noumenon) he is not to be valued
merely as a means to the ends of
others or even to his own ends, but
as an end in himself, that is, he
possesses a dignity (an absolute in-
ner worth) by which he exacts re-
spect for himself from all other
beings in the world.21
Hence, the Kantian right never to be
treated only as a means derives from
dignity. Yet, before one can accept that
human beings have such rights due to
their absolute inner worth, one has to
explain why they have dignity. Only if
one can support this move can one
assign rights to people.
According to Kant, human beings
have dignity because of their reasoning
faculties, which give them the freedom
and ability to distinguish moral from
immoral actions. They are ‘‘the subject
of a morally practical reason.’’22 Or as
Kant scholars often put it, human
beings have dignity because of their
’’rational nature in its capacity to be
morally self-legislative.’’23 They can go
beyond simply following rules given
externally through authorities. They
can ponder whether or not it is morally
right to lie and can come to the conclu-
sion that it is not. This conclusion is
open to all rational humans; humans
can think and give themselves moral
commandments. They are autonomous
and, according toKant, ’’autonomy is . . .
the ground of the dignity of human
nature and of every rational nature.’’24
Allen Wood paraphrases this idea of
Kant’s in the following manner:
We could sum up the qualities Kant
thinks make for dignity if we said that
dignity belongs to the capacity to think
for oneself and direct one’s own life
with responsibility both for one’s own
well-being and for the way one’s
actions affect the rights and welfare
of others.25
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For Kant, holders of dignity and hu-
man beings in general are therefore
two distinct groups, and the latter is
larger than the former. Some human
beings, such as patients in a permanent
vegetative state (PVS), have irrevers-
ibly lost the capacity to direct their
own lives and, by implication, no lon-
ger have dignity in the strict Kantian
sense. This may be a deplorable result,
but if one stays within the Kantian
justification of dignity, it is unavoid-
able. A more accurate Kantian defini-
tion of dignity would therefore be:
Dignity is an inviolable26 property
invested in all rational beings due to
their capacity for moral self-legislation,
which gives the possessor the right
never to be treated simply as a means,
but always at the same time as an end.
The emphasis in this definition is on
the capacity for moral self-legislation.
This means that all those who are still
developing the capacity (e.g., children)
or all those who have only lost it
temporarily (e.g., reversible coma or
sleep) are included. This move closes
the reasoning gap on why most human
beings have the right never to be treated
as a means only. Persons, as Kant calls
them, the subjects of a morally practical
reason, are exalted above any price and
possess an absolute inner worth, that is,
dignity, because of their capacity for
moral self-legislation. They can always
exact respect from others, that is, they
have rights. With this move to justify
rights, however, we have lost the attri-
bution of dignity to all human beings.
At this juncture, one can only retain one
of the two. Either we keep a foundation
for rights, namely the Kantian justifica-
tion equating dignity with the capacity
for moral self-legislation and lose its
attribution to all human beings, or we
attribute dignity and rights to all human
beings while losing its justification.
The use of dignity in constitutional
law and international legal instruments
does exactly that: attribute dignity to all
human beings without reference to its
foundation. For instance, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights recog-
nizes in its Preamble the ‘‘inherent
dignity . . . of all members of the human
family.’’27 The European Constitution
(II-61) maintains that human dignity is
inviolable.28 Inviolable human dignity
cannot be lost as the only condition is
being human. There is no difference,
therefore, between PVS patients and
a rational, autonomous decisionmaker
in this regard. They each partake of
dignity in equal measure. Indeed, my
earlier definition of Kantian dignity fits
this description:
Dignity is an inviolable property of
all human beings, which gives the
possessor the right never to be trea-
ted simply as a means, but always at
the same time as an end.
This definition of dignity could still be
perfectly legitimate, of course, if one
found a justification for dignity, which
applied to all human beings.
For instance, for Christians, dignity
derives from God and the belief that
human beings are formed in his image.
The Catholic Director of a Canadian
Centre for Clinical Ethics, Hazel Mark-
well, describes this as follows: ‘‘The
value of dignity of the individual arises
from the belief that life has intrinsic
worth because people are created in
the image and likeness of God.’’29
Commenting on care for PVS patients,
the Archbishop of Philadelphia Cardinal
Justin Rigali and Bishop William Lori
say: ‘‘Our love and support for patients
in P.V.S. should be modelled on God’s
love, which is based not on their current
ability to act and respond but on their
enduring dignity as human beings,
made in his image and likeness and
facing an ultimate destiny with him.’’30
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This belief has also been expressed
by Pope John Paull II as follows: ‘‘Man,
living man, is the glory of God (Gloria
Dei vivens homo). . . . Man has been
given a sublime dignity, based on the
intimate bond which unites him to his
Creator: in man there shines forth a re-
flection of God himself.’’31
For Christians, this would complete
the justification of dignity and its attri-
bution to all, that is, the first part of any
definition (Dignity is an inviolable prop-
erty of all human beings). However, the
second part would still be open. What
exactly is dignity? Or, failing clarity on
this point, what does it achieve or de-
mand?
It is possible to deduce the demands
Christian dignity places upon others
from speeches and texts. For instance,
Patrick Lee, a Catholic Professor of
Bioethics, argues that ’’suicide [is] con-
trary to the intrinsic dignity of human
persons.’’32 Presbyterian minister and
bioethicist Holly Vautier maintains that
the ’’dignity of all human life has been
influential in maintaining . . . prohibi-
tions against abortion.’’33 Pope John
Paul II declared that even ’’our brothers
and sisters who find themselves in the
clinical condition of a ’vegetative state’
retain their human dignity in all its
fullness.’’34
From the above Christian prohibi-
tions against suicide, abortion, and
the withdrawal of artificial feeding/
hydration one can conclude that, for
Christians, God-given dignity makes
every human life sacred. If dignity
forbids suicide or the removal of feed-
ing tubes, dignity demands respect for
the sanctity of human life. This link
between dignity and the sanctity of life
is most clearly expressed in Pope John
Paul II’s ’’The Gospel of Life," an
encyclical issued in 1995. In it, he says:
‘‘[T]he Gospel of the dignity of the
person and the Gospel of life are a sin-
gle and indivisible Gospel.’’35
An appropriate definition to capture
Christian dignity is, therefore:
Dignity is an inviolable property
invested by God in all human beings,
which makes their life sacred.
In the above, I have redefined Kantian
dignity to differentiate it from Chris-
tian dignity and to capture Kant’s
emphasis on the human capacity for
self-legislation. Recognizing that some
Christians accept abortion and many
the removal of feeding tubes in PVS
patients,36 I term my fifth concept of
dignity ’’Traditional Christian Dignity.’’
Aspirational versus Inviolable
Dignity
Five different meanings of dignity: Is
that not confusing? Does this not con-
firm the critics’ view that dignity is
a useless, dubious conversation stop-
per, an idea that cannot be thought? In
many respects, yes. If we had five
different words to capture these five
different meanings of dignity, ethical
debates could proceed more smoothly.
However, dignity is so omnipresent in
human discourse that ’’the demand to
purge it from ethical discourse amounts
to whistling in the wind.’’37
Let me return to the three conditions
that make a principle useful in ethical
debates: (a) widely known, (b) speci-
fied, and (c) attributable. Dignity is
a concept that is widely known beyond
any doubt.38 It is also a concept that
can be specified, if one is prepared to
allow for several, distinct meanings. To
simplify matters, I now group the five
different meanings into two groups39
before proceeding to an assessment of
point (c), attributability.
Aristocratic, comportment, and mer-
itorious dignity require deliberate and
conscious effort, the measuring up
to a standard, the fulfillment of an
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aspiration. Whether the new Prince of
Sweden will measure up to the expect-
ations applying to those of superior
rank depends on his understanding of
these expectations and his efforts and
willingness to comply. Whether the
next politician being accused of adul-
tery will show more equipoise and
calm comportment depends on his un-
derstanding and acceptance of societal
expectations and his resulting efforts.
Whether somebody deserves the honor
of dignity according to Aristotle, and
thereby the Goethean wreath, depends
on her efforts to be virtuous.
By contrast, Kantian dignity and
traditional Christian dignity involve
no element of conscious effort or aspi-
ration. They belong to human beings as
an inviolable birthright, either forever
or with the Kantian proviso, as long as
they have the capacity for rationality.
What human beings do with this birth-
right is immaterial. Pedophiles, rapists,
and mass murderers partake in Kantian
and traditional Christian dignity in the
same way as Maximilian Kolbe, Steve
Biko, or Sophie Scholl. Using a broad
stroke, one can therefore distinguish
two types of dignity: aspirational and
inviolable dignity.
As I have shown in an earlier CQ
piece,40 medical ethics debates can be
illuminated significantly by taking into
account the different meanings of dig-
nity. For instance, Death with Dignity
organizations often focus on aspira-
tional dignity in discussions of eutha-
nasia and physician-assisted dying
whereas their opponents focus on in-
violable dignity.
Attributing Dignity: The Remaining
Problem
The remaining problem with the con-
cept of dignity in ethical debates lies
elsewhere. As noted earlier, prominent
human rights declarations or constitu-
tions confer dignity upon all human
beings. In this regard, their use of the
term dignity aligns with the traditional
Christian understanding and none of
the others. At the same time, most of
the constitutions allow suicide, abor-
tion, and sometimes physician-assisted
dying. Hence, they do not align with
the prescriptions that come with their
adopted version of dignity. Fetuses are
exempt from the prescriptions, dying
patients are exempt, and so are suicidal
persons. As a result, the use of dignity
in constitutions seems arbitrary. If dig-
nity were God given and linked to the
sanctity of life, it would—at least in the
traditional Christian understanding—
prohibit certain actions. If these actions
are allowed, the biblical derivation of
dignity cannot apply, and therefore its
attribution to all cannot be justified.
However, the Kantian derivation does
not apply either, as constitutional dig-
nity is attributed to all human beings,
including PVS patients who have ir-
revocably lost their capacity for moral
self-legislation.
The fact that human beings are un-
derstood to have dignity must then be
a contractual agreement between legit-
imate representatives and their peo-
ples, transformed into written law. It
is then attributed to all by contractual
agreement rather than philosophical
justification. It is simply a decision
made by parliamentarians on behalf
of its peoples. However, if that is the
case, human dignity is no longer spe-
cial and distinguishable from agreed-
upon human rights. As a consequence
and given its myriad meanings, it
might then be advisable to achieve
contractual agreement on specific hu-
man rights and dispense with a refer-
ence to human dignity in constitutions.
Not because the principle of dignity
fails on condition (a); it is widely
known. And not because it fails on
condition (b); it can be specified in at
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least five meaningful ways. But becau-
se—to date—it has been impossible to
achieve reasonable agreement on con-
dition (c), to whom can dignity be
attributed?
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